LIBEL AND SLANDER-

PRIVILEGE-NEWSPERSONS

PRIVILEGE UNDER NEW JERSEY SHIELD LAW NOT
TORIAL PROCESSES IN CIVIL LIBEL

HAVE ABSOLUTE

To

DISCLOSE EDI-

AcTiONs-Maressa v. New Jer-

sey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
211 (1982).
In Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly,' a public figure 2 who alleged
he had been libeled found himself without legal redress following the
New Jersey Supreme Court's holding that newspersons have an absolute privilege not to disclose their editorial processes. The controversy
began with the publication of an article entitled "Rating the Legisla4
ture" in the October 1979 issue of New Jersey Monthly (NIM).
Described as the second biennial feature of this type,, the article
grouped and rated members of the New Jersey Legislature in a forthright, breezily sarcastic manner. 6 Under the two main categories,
"The Best" and "The Worst", a small picture of each lawmaker listed
was followed by a description of his putative triumphs achieved or
blunders committed in office during the term of the legislature. 7
Senator Joseph Maressa, a Democrat from Waterford Township," i n
addition to being called "sneaky, self-interested, and basically unprin-

89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211, 211-12 (1982).
2

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388

U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) for libel rules applicable
to public officials and public figures.
3 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379; see Carpenter, Fisher & Narus, Rating the Legislature,
N.J. MONTHLY, Oct. 1979, at 53.
4 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379. NIM, published 12 times a year as its title implies, was
established in November of 1976 and deals exclusively with people and events in New Jersey. The
magazine claimed a circulation of 105,000 in 1981. 1981 WRITER'S MARKET 477 (J. Brady & P.J.
Schemenaur eds.).
5 Carpenter, supra note 3, at 53. The first article appeared in the October 1977 issue of the
magazine. See Fisher, Carpenter, Niemann, Advokat & Miles, Rating the Legislature, N.J.
MONTHLY, Oct. 1977, at 39. Maressa was on "The Worst" list, although the tone of the segment
describing him was less acerbic than that of the 1979 article. Id. at 45-46.
6 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379. The lawmakers were categorized as "The Best," "The
Worst," "The Comers," "Noteworthy," "Not Worthy," and "The Drones." Carpenter, supra
note 3. Senator Maressa was included as one of the worst. 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379.
Among other things, "The Worst" list was called "a guide to ... anyone who actively sabotaged
the legislative process." Carpenter, supra note 3, at 53.
1 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379. New Jersey's 198th Legislature was officially convened in
January of 1979. According to the article, however, most of the legislators who earned a place on
the lists did so by virtue of actions taken during the summer of 1979, when an apparently large
number of bills supported by Governor Byrne were passed. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 53.
8 Carpenter, supra note 3,at 57.
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cipled" and "a pompous moralist,"' 0 was portrayed generally as a
somewhat fatuous, careless legislator" with a "tendency to bend rules
1
to his own advantage." 2
On December 12, 1979, Senator Maressa filed a libel action,
naming NJM's owner, publisher, editor-in-chief, executive editor, and
the article's authors as -defendants.13 Aside from asserting that they
had published 14 defamatory falsehoods, Maressa claimed the defendants' failure to assess properly the veracity of the published information constituted reckless disregard of the truth.15 To substantiate this
allegation, Maressa sought the identities of all the reporters' sources,
as well as copies of any documents pertaining to the editorial decisions
made in the course of preparing the article, through the use of interrogatories and depositions.6 The defendants, relying on the New
Jersey Shield Law, 17 replied that the answers to those questions were
9 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379 (quoting Carpenter, supra note 3, at 57).
10 Carpenter, supra note 3, at 61. The barbs directed at other members of the legislature,
although less numerous than those directed at Senator Maressa. were no less keen: Rep. Kenneth
Gewertz, D-Deptford: "loud-mouthed, boorish and crass . . .a raving demagogue," id. at 5657; Sen. Angelo Errichetti, D-Camden: "a small-time hack," id. at 61; Rep. Thomas Gallo, DHoboken: "conspicuously non-descript," id. at 105; Sen. Walter Sheil, D-Jerse3 City: "another of
those durable Hudson lackeys," id. at 106; Rep. Mary Scanlon, D-Newark: "does not belong in
the state legislature." Id. at 111.
1 Id. at 56-57. The authors observed, for example, that after vehemently voicing his
opposition to setting the age of sexual consent at 13 years, Senator Maressa inadvertently cast the
swing vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of the proposal. Id.
1 Id. at 57. The Maressa court noted that the article stated that Senator Maressa lied to the
sergeant at arms in order to sneak a lobbyist onto the Senate floor during debate, and that he was
called before the Legislative Ethics Committee on an unrelated matter. 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d
at 379.
3 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379.
14 Id. at 183, 445 A.2d at 379. The term "publication" is used here in a dual sense, both as "a
business term meaning printing and distribution of written materials and [as] a legal term
meaning communication of libelous matter to a third person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105
(rev. 5th ed. 1979) (citing Applewhite v. Memphis State Univ., 495 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tenn.
1973)).
11 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 379. Maressa admitted that as a public figure suing to recover
damages for libel, he would have to prove "reckless or willful disregard of the truth." 89 N.J. at
183 n.1, 445 A.2d at 379 n.1; see infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
16 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380. Specifically, he requested the names and addresses of all
persons supplying information, a summary of what they had told the defendants, and copies of
all memos, notes, rough drafts, or questions written in relation to the article. Id.
17 N.J. R. EVID. 27 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Cum. Supp. -1982-1983))
provides in pertinent part:
Subject to Rule 37, a person . . .employed by news media for the purpose of
gathering, . . compiling, editing, or disseminating news for the general public...
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, . . .
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any
information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted,
compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
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"privileged." ' 8 The trial court, however, did not share this interpretation of the statute, and on June 27, 1980 granted the plaintiff's request
for an order compelling more specific answers to the interrogatories
and deposition questions. 9 Once more, through supplemental interrogatories, the questionable questions were asked, and again the defendants declined to respond. 20 Consequently, on October 15, 1980,
the defendants faced the prospect of judicial sanctions if they failed to
give more specific replies to Senator Maressa's queries within twenty
days. 2' Their appeal of that disclosure order was pending before the
appellate division when the New Jersey Supreme Court directly certified the dispute on its own motion.2 2 The supreme court held that the
Shield Law affords newspersons an absolute privilege not to disclose
either their sources or their editorial processes during discovery in a
23
civil libel action.
Libel actions are subsumed under the law of defamation. 24 Defamation jurisprudence has been described as imposing "broad liability
for the publication of false matters which tend to injure the reputation
of others," 25 and as embodying "the important public policy that
individuals . . . should generally be free to enjoy their reputations
unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks." '2 6 At common law,
privileges to publish without liability for defamation reflect the belief
that at times, society's interest in free expression outweighs an individual's interest in his reputation. 27 If society's interest is strong enough,

b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional
activities whether or not it is disseminated.
Id. [hereinafter cited to N.J. STAT. ANN. without cross reference to N.J. R. EVID.].
'8 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380.
IId. The law division ruled alternatively: The information which Maressa sought was not
privileged, and even if it were, that privilege had been waived. Id.; see infra note 126.
20 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380.
21 Id.; see N.J. CT. R. 4:23.
22 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380; see N.J. CT. R. 2:12-1 which provides that "[t]he Supreme
Court may on its own motion certify any action or class of actions for appeal."
23 89 N.J. at 181-82, 445 A.2d at 379.
24 See W. PRossEn, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (1971). Defamation encompasses
both libel, which is written or printed words, and slander, which is oral publication. See id. §
112. This distinction has been blurred with the advent of motion picture and television communications. Id.
25 Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d 889, 891
(1955); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 111. The term "publication" does not necessarily
refer to the printing process, nor to a result of that means of production. See supra note 14.
26 Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d 889, 891
(1955).
27 Id. at 557-58, 117 A.2d at 891.
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the privilege is absolute. 2 Qualified or conditional privileges arise
when the defendant can show "a recognized public or private interest
which would justify the utterance of the words, ' 29 but the privilege is
lost if he acted with malice. 30 The publication of "fair comment" on
topics of general concern, for example, is protected by the qualified
privilege. 3 1 The fair comment privilege was often claimed by reporters
in libel actions.

32

There was, however, no New Jersey common-law privilege allowing a newsperson not to reveal his sources of information. 33 The
need for such protection was recognized in 1933 with the enactment
of New Jersey's first Shield Law. 34 Basically, under that statute's
provisions, persons associated with a newspaper could not be compelled to disclose in any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding the
35
source of any information which they had obtained and published.
In response to narrow judicial interpretation of the law, 36 in 1960 the

28 Id. at 558, 117 A.2d at 891-92, Statements made during judicial proceedings are afforded
absolute protection because of the importance of candor and complete latitude of expression on
the part of parties, witnesses, judges, jurors, and attorneys. See La Porta v. Leonard, 88 N.J.L.
663, 97 A. 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
28 Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 376, 149 A.2d 193. 203 (1959)
(quoting W. PRossEaR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 629 (2d ed. 1955)).
1o Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 558, 117 A.2d 889, 892
(1955). Malice is implied by law whenever it is shown that an intentional defamatory publication has been made. W. PRossEa, supra note 24, § 113, at 771-72. This is distinct from express
malice, which connotes ill will or wrongful motive on the part of the defendant. Bock v.
Plainfield Courier-News, 45 N.J. Super. 302, 312, 132 A.2d 523, 528 (App. Div. 1957); see also
Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super. 112, 167 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1961).
" Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 131 A.2d 781 (1957). The court in Leers identified the
following factors to be considered in determining whether a statement constitutes fair comment:
(a) the facts on which the statement is based must be true, (b) any imputation of corrupt or
dishonorable motives must be warranted by the facts, and (c) the statement must be the honest
expression of the writer's opinion. Id. at 254-55, 131 A.2d at 788-89; see also Neigel v. Seaboard
Fin. Co., 68 N.J. Super. 542, 173 A.2d 300 (App. Div. 1961); Merrey v. Guardian Printing &
Publishing Co., 79 N.J.L. 177, 74 A. 464 (Sup. Ct. 1909). af'd, 81 N.J.L. 632, 80 A. 331 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1911).
12 See Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 131 A.2d 781 (1957), Bock v. Plainfield Courier-News, 45
N.J. Super. 302, 132 A.2d 523 (App. Div. 1957). But cf. Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J.
62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982) (suggesting fair comment defense obsolete in light of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions).
11 In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1913); cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (newspaper reporter not afforded constitutional testimonial privilege to withhold facts relevant to grand jury criminal investigation).
34 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:97-11 (1933) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)).
35 Id.
3' The statute was judicially construed only once between 1933 and 1956. See State v.
Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 486, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (common-law rights should
prevail over legislative restrictions unless legislative restrictions are clearly expressed).
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legislature expanded its protection to include not only the source, but
also the "author, means, agency or person from or through whom any
information published . . . was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, or delivered. ' 37 Thus, the identities of those assisting in the
newspaper person's collection of confidential information which was
later published were protected from disclosure.
The statute was again controversially interpreted in 1972. In In
re Bridge,3 Peter Bridge, a reporter for the Newark Evening News,
was held in contempt of court for refusing to answer a grand jury's
questions regarding information which he may have acquired in researching an article about an apparent attempt to bribe a city housing
official. 39 The appellate division held that under N.J. Evid. R. 37,40
Bridge had waived the Shield Law's protection of nondisclosed information which he possessed by naming his source and by using information acquired from that source in his newspaper article. 4'
Following Bridge, the New Jersey Legislature amended the
Shield Law, creating separate privileges for sources and for information so that disclosure of either would not constitute a waiver of the
privilege protecting the other. 42 Significantly, the revision extended
the privilege to "[a]ny news or information obtained in the course of
pursuing . . . professional activities, whether or not it is disseminated, ' 43 so that even nonpublished information which was not ac44
quired through a confidential source was now protected.
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1960) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp. 19821983)) provided: "Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, connected with, or employed by, a
newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the source, author, means, agency or person from
or through whom any information published in such newspaper was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, or delivered." Id.; see also Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing
Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (Law Div. 1964) (1960 amendments designed to circumvent Donovan ruling).
31 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
11 Id. at 464, 295 A.2d at 5.
40 N.J. R. Evio. 37 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (West 1976)) [hereinafter cited
to N.J. STAT. ANN. without cross reference to N.J. R. EVID.]. The first paragraph of the rule
provides that one waives the privilege by disclosing "any part of the privileged matter." Id. This
is qualified by the second paragraph of the rule, which provides that no waiver results from a
disclosure that is itself privileged. Id.
41 120 N.J. Super. at 466, 295 A.2d at 5-6. The court relied only on the first paragraph of the
rule in reaching its decision. See id. The second paragraph of the rule could not apply since the
1960 Shield Law only protected sources. See In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423
A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980).
42 In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 456, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980); see also supra
note 41.
13N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1977) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp. 19821983)). Id. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) defines "in the course of pursuing
professional activities" as any situation in which information is obtained for the purpose of
dissemination. Id.
14 In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 456, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980). Additionally,
the 1977 amendments made the Shield Law applicable to all news media and enumerated the
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The latest changes to the Shield Law were enacted in response to
45
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Farber.
Myron Farber, a reporter for the New York Times, had done extensive
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the mysterious
deaths of patients in a New Jersey hospital. 46 The resulting newspaper
articles were apparently instrumental in the state's decision to prosecute Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich for murder. 47 During that trial, a
subpoena duces tecum was issued directing Farber and/or the New
York Times to provide Jascalevich with certain documents and materials compiled in the course of Farber's investigation. 48 Their refusal to
comply with the subpoena and with a subsequent order directing
production of the materials for in camera inspection resulted in civil
and criminal contempt citations for both Farber and the Times. 49
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Farber affirmed the contempt convictions, holding that the newsperson's Shield Law privilege
must give way to a defendant's right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses under article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. 50 The United States Supreme Court also denied the Times and
Farber a stay of their contempt sentences. 5' In rejecting defendants'
stay requests, both Courts relied upon Branzburg v. Hayes,52 in which
the United States Supreme Court rejected a reporter's claim that
compelling his testimony before a grand jury interfered with his first
53
amendment rights.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Farber was careful to point
out, however, that a shield law was not present in Branzburg, and
proceedings in which the privilege could be invoked. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1977)
(current version at id. (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)); cf. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:97-11 (1933)
(current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)) (1977 amendments reinstated representative list of proceedings appearing in 1933 statute in which privilege
was applicable, inexplicably omitted from 1960 version).
45 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
46 Id. at 277-78, 394 A.2d at 339.
47 Id. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332.
48 Id. at 263-64, 394 A.2d at 332.
41 Id. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332.
'o Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337 (citing N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 10); see, e.g., Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process clause of sixth amendment prevails over testimonial privilege created by state statute); cf. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (need for properly
functioning criminal justice system may override executive privilege).
51 New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301 (1978) (opinion of White, J., in
chambers). Justice White declared that newsmen have no constitutional privilege to withhold
documents subpoenaed in the prosecution or defense of a criminal case. Id. at 1302 (opinion of
White, J., in chambers).
-1 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
-3 New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (opinion of White, J.,
in
chambers); Farber, 78 N.J. at 265-66, 394 A.2d at 333; see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-09.
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that it considered New Jersey's law to evince a legislative intent "to
protect the confidential sources of the press as well as information so
obtained. . . to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of
the United States and that of the State of New Jersey."5 4 In deference
to that intent, the court enunciated certain criteria that had to be met
for enforcement of a subpoena of a newsperson's materials in a criminal prosecution.5 5 The person seeking enforcement must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability
that the material is relevant to his defense, that there is no less
intrusive source of the information, and that he has a valid need to see
56
and use the material.
The 1979 Shield Law amendments relating to the subpoena of
documents incorporated these standards into the law, and also added
the requirement that one seeking disclosure show that disclosure of the
requested information outweighs the newsperson's privilege. 57 The
New Jersey Supreme Court applied these new provisions shortly after
their enactment, characterizing them as consistent with what it perceived to be a legislative "intent to provide newspeople with as broad
a privilege against disclosure as can be reconciled with a defendant's
5'
Sixth Amendment rights. 1

54 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335. The court stated that the legislative intent behind the
Shield Law was to protect "confidential sources . . .as well as information so obtained." Id.
Justice Mountain's use of the word "so" apparently excluded from protection information not
received from a confidential source. Thus, he recognized a legislative intent to protect a narrower class of information than was covered by the Shield Law. See In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176
N.J. Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980). To what extent the legislature intended to
protect nonprivileged information was thus left unresolved by the Farbercourt.
-" 78 N.J. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337.
51 Id. at 276-77, 394 A.2d at 338.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.3(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). The amended portion
of the Shield Law provides in pertinent part:
To overcome . ..a prima facie showing . . .the party seeking enforcement of
the subpena shall show by clear and convincing evidence that the privilege has been
waived . .. or by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable
probability that the subpenaed materials are relevant, material and necessary to the
defense, that they could not be secured from any less intrusive source, that the value
of the material sought as it bears upon the issues of guilt or innocence outweighs the
privilege against disclosure, and that the request is not overbroad. . . .Publication
shall constitute a waiver only as to the specific materials published.
Id. But cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703-06 (constitutional newsmen's privilege denied partly
because of need for preliminary determinations of materiality and unavailability similar to those
called for by 1979 Shield Law amendments).
51State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 458, 414 A.2d 14, 20 (1980). The court held that the
criminal defendant had failed the "less intrusive source" portion of the statutory test and so
denied his request for enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 461-62, 414 A.2d at 22.
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The New Jersey Shield Law has thus evolved from the relatively
narrow statute of 1933, which covered only a newspaper reporter's
original sources, into its present form wherein persons connected with
all news media are accorded a privilege not to disclose their sourcesoriginal or otherwise-and any information acquired in the course of
pursuing their professional activities. Waiver of the privilege has been
made more difficult, and procedural safeguards have been added to
ensure that the privilege is not unduly circumscribed in the course of
determining whether or not it must yield to a criminal defendant's
sixth amendment rights. Clearly, the trend in the development of the
New Jersey Shield Law has been toward greater protection against the
compelled disclosure of information gathered by newspersons, or of
the identities of their confidential sources.
In addition to the statutory protection of media sources and
information, newspersons have been accorded enhanced protection
against defamation suits brought by public officials since the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan. 59 In that case, the Court denied relief in a libel action
against the defendant New York Times because the plaintiff had failed
to establish that the allegedly defamatory falsehoods were published
with "actual malice." ° The Court held that this standard was applicable to public officials suing for libel regarding their official conduct,6 and that it required plaintiffs to prove, with "convincing
clarity,"112 that the statement was made "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."6 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned that the common
law did not prevent undesirable self-censorship by newspersons fearful
of the difficulty and expense of having to prove the truth of their

59 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
eId. at 279-80. Sullivan, an elected Commissioner of Public Affairs, claimed that descriptions appearing in the Times of how the Montgomery, Alabama authorities handled certain
racial disturbances constituted defamatory falsehoods regarding his official conduct. Id. at 25658.
"' Id. at 283.
62 Id. at 285-86; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (describing
New York Times as requiring "clear and convincing" proof); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 782-83 (1978) (noting that "convincing clarity"
probably means more than a "preponderance," but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt"). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-13 (1978).
" 376 U.S. at 279-80; see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (reckless disregard
for truth present if "false statements [are] made with ... high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity"); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); cf. W. PROssER,
supra note 24, § 18, at 821-22 (suggesting that focus on defendant's knowledge of falsity makes
actual malice standard more akin to scienter, than to common-law malice).
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publications when confronted with a libel action. 4 The guarantee of
freedom of expression on public matters embodied in the first amendment 5 required that public officials bear the burden of proving
knowing or reckless publication of falsity before they could recover
damages for libelous statements regarding their official conduct. 6
The Court reasoned that the deterrent effect of libel actions on pro67
spective critics of official conduct would thereby be greatly lessened,
should be uninhibited,
and "the principle that debate on public issues
68
preserved.
be
would
wide-open"
and
robust,
Later cases extended this actual malice requirement to libel
actions brought by public figures,' and clarified the dimensions of the
actual malice standard.70 It was held that reckless disregard for truth
cannot be shown by the defendant's mere negligence, nor by his
failure to properly investigate, 7 1 but rather requires "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. ' 72 Thus, a plaintiff
subject to the New York Times rule bears the heavy burden of proving, with convincing clarity, the defendant's state of mind regarding
73
the veracity of his information or sources prior to publication.
The United States Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lando,'7 recog7
nizing the substantial nature of a New York Times plaintiff's burden

376 U.S. at 279.
11 The first amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Il 376 U.S. at 279-80.
67 Id.
Id. at 270-72, 279-80.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). The Gertz Court defined public figures as those who "have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society," or who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345.
,o See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
71 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 733 (1968).
71 Id. at 731.
71 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see also Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to
Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The FirstAmendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
777, 782-84 (1975) (combination of need to prove defendant's state of mind and convincing
clarity standard creates heavy burden for New York Times plaintiffs); Eaton, The American
Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61
VA. L. REV. 1349, 1375 n.113 (1975) (listing of only 17 cases in 11 years following New York
Times wherein plaintiffs succeeded in proving actual malice).
7' 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
s Id. at 174. The Court stated: "The evidentiary burden . . . to prove at least reckless
disregard for the truth is substantial indeed." Id.; see also supra note 73.
14
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refused to recognize a newsperson's privilege not to disclose editorial
processes during discovery in libel actions brought by public figures or
officials. 76 The plaintiff, a retired Army officer, became a public
figure as the result of extensive media coverage he had received in
1969-1970 when he alleged that his superior officers in Viet Nam had
concealed reports of war crimes. 77 Herbert claimed that a television
segment later produced and edited by Lando falsely portrayed him as
having made those charges dishonestly, and so brought a libel action
78
for damages.
During the course of discovery, Lando refused to answer questions regarding his state of mind, arguing that the first amendment
prohibited inquiries into the editorial process. 79 This argument was
rejected by the district court, which reasoned that such a limitation on
discovery would unduly increase the public figure libel plaintiffs
burden of proof.8 0 That decision was overturned on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8 1 Chief Judge
Kaufman's plurality opinion viewed such discovery as an invasion of
the first amendment rights of newspersons holding "grave implica'
tions for the vitality of the editorial process." 82
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit
court's decision and held that denying discovery of a defendant's
editorial process "would constitute a substantial interference with the
ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice
as required by New York Times. "83 The majority reasoned that dis-

76 441 U.S. at 155.
77

Id. at 155-56.

71 Id. at 156.

11 Id. at 157. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit categorized the objectionable
questions as those dealing with Lando's conclusions as to people or leads to be pursued, the
veracity of his sources, and the basis for his belief in their reliability. Editorial conversations were
also sought. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 983 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
10 Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd,
441 U.S. 153 (1979). The district court stated:
If the malicious publisher is permitted to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's
already heavy burden of proof by a narrow and restricted application of the discovery rules, so that the plaintiff is denied discovery into areas which in the nature of
the case lie solely with the defendant, then the law in effect provides an arras behind
which malicious publication may go undetected and unpunished. Nothing in the
First Amendment requires such a result.
Id. at 394.
"1 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
82 Id. at 984. Chief Judge Kaufman stated that the court's task, in light of the recent trend in
the law of libel toward greater freedom of expression, was to allow discovery only when it would
minimally restrict robust debate on public issues. Id. at 980.
" 441 U.S. at 170.
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covery could only chill the publication of knowing or reckless falsehoods, as intended by New York Times and its progeny,8 4 and that the
threat of liability, rather than restricting the editorial process, should
result in even more careful editorial examination of information to be
published . 5 Justice White pointed out, however, that the editorial
process is not open to perfunctory examination, and implied that it
would only be discoverable when it is alleged that the defendant
published either knowing that the statement was false or with reckless
86
disregard for its truth, and that a specific injury thereby resulted.
It was against this historical background that Maressa was decided. Justice Pashman, writing for the majority, initially observed
that New Jersey's Supreme Court recently had held the newsperson's
privilege provided by the Shield Law to be less than absolute when it
conflicts with a criminal defendant's constitutional right to compel the
production of witnesses on his or her behalf.8 7 The court was also
careful, however, to reassert the Farberholding that the Shield Law is
to be construed as protecting the news media's confidential information "to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States and that of the State of New Jersey."'8 8 The court stated
that the issue was whether newspersons sued for libel may, under the
Shield Law, refuse to divulge both their sources and the editorial
processes which led to the purportedly defamatory publication.8 9 The
proper inquiry was whether the effect of the shield law is to be
circumscribed by some conflicting constitutional right.9

See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
11 Id. at 173-74.
86 Id. at 174. justice Brennan dissented in part based on his view that editorial processes
consist of two elements: the defendant's mental processes, and communications among editors.
Id. at 192-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). The editor's thought processes could not be chilled
by the threat of discovery, noted Justice Brennan, since thought is essential to a newsperson's
work. Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Moreover, since the New York Times malice
test depends upon proof of the defendant's state of mind, he stated that "[i]t would be anomalous
to turn substantive liability on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield
from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude." Id. As for communications between
newspersons, Justice Brennan observed that they should receive a qualified privilege, similar to
the executive privilege, id. at 193-94 (Brennan, J.,dissenting in part), that could be overcome if
the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant had published a defamatory
falsehood. Id. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
87 89 N.J. at 181, 445 A.2d at 379; see State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (1980); In
re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
88 89 N.J. at 181, 445 A.2d at 379 (quoting Farber, 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335).
84

88 Id.
88 Id. at 181-82, 445 A.2d at 379.
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Justice Pashman noted that the newsperson's privilege in New
Jersey was based on a 1933 statute, 9 ' and that these protections are
codified as the result of a legislative judgment that society's interest in
full disclosure is subordinate to the public interest served by the
statutory privilege enacted. 92 The newsperson's privilege was seen by
the court as having a constitutional basis, and Branzburg was cited for
the proposition that a reporter's information gathering is accorded at
least some first amendment protection. 93 The court noted, however,
that this privilege is only qualified, as demonstrated by both Branzburg and Lando, and characterized Lando as holding that "the First
Amendment does not preclude a plaintiffs inquiries into . . . editorial
processes. "94

The court next focused specifically on the development of the
Shield Law. The 1977 and 1979 amendments to the Shield Law,
according to the majority, were reactions to narrow judicial interpretations of that statute, and were intended "[t]o buttress the constitutional protection for news gathering." 95 Specifically, the court observed that in In re Bridge, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the disclosure of the name of a reporter's source and some of the
information received from that source effected a waiver of the statutory privilege, thus leading to the 1977 amendments.9 6 In addition to
altering the statute so as to preclude a finding of waiver in future cases
similar to Bridge, the Maressa court stated that the amendments
"thoroughly revamped the newsperson's privilege to make it more
comprehensive," and revealed a legislative intent "to provide comprehensive protection for all aspects of news gathering and dissemina97
tion."
The 1979 amendments inspired by Farber codified procedural
criteria for judicial enforcement of subpoenas in this sensitive area.

91 Id. at 184, 445 A.2d at 380.
92 Id.
11 Id.; see also Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy: What Does it Add To
Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975). The court noted that a number of lower federal courts had extended Branzburg'sfirst
amendment protection of news gathering to the use of confidential sources. 89 N.J. at 184, 455
A.2d at 380; see, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-95
(1st Cir. 1980); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197,
1202 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also Lindberg, Source Protection in Libel Suits, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
338 (1981).
94 89 N.J. at 185, 445 A.2d at 381; see supra notes 52 & 53, 74-86 and accompanying text.
15 89 N.J. at 185, 445 A.2d at 381.
Id. at 186, 445 A.2d at 381.
I1
97 Id.
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Justice Pashman observed that in applying those amendments in State
v. Boiardo,98 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reiterated the Farber
view that the Shield Law privilege "was intended by the Legislature
to be as broad as possible."9 9 The combination of the two amendments
to the Shield Law, and the two supreme court decisions broadly
interpreting their import, led the Maressa majority to conclude that
unless there is a contravening constitutional right, an absolute privilege not to reveal confidential information is provided to newspersons
by the New Jersey Shield Law. 100
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that, because editorial processes are not specifically listed in the statute, they are not
protected from disclosure.' 0 ' Referring to this argument as "simplistic," Justice Pashman reasoned that the "exhaustive list"',0 2 of protected activities in the statute clearly demonstrated a legislative intent
"to afford complete and pervasive security against disclosure . . . [to]
all significant news-gathering activities," including, by implication,
editorial processes. 0 3 The court relied on Justice Brennan's dissent in
Lando for the proposition that discovery of editorial processes is particularly damaging because reporters will curtail their "creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives" 04
in apprehension of later having to reveal the character and content of
such conversations in a court of law. 0 Although the United States
Supreme Court in Lando held that there is no first amendment privilege not to disclose editorial processes, the Maressa court found Lando
06
inapposite because there was no shield law involved in that case.'
The court reasoned that since Branzburg did not affect the ability of
state courts to recognize a newsperson's privilege, "either qualified or
absolute," derived from their own constitutions,0 7 there is an equivalent power to construe and enforce a newsperson's privilege created by

" 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (1980).
99 89 N.J. at 187, 445 A.2d at 382 (quoting Boiardo, 82 N.J. at 457, 414 A.2d at 20)
(emphasis added by Maressa court).

100Id. at 187, 445 A.2d at 382.
"I Id. at 188. 445 A.2d at 382.
102Id. See supra note 17.
103 89 N.J. at 188, 445 A.2d at 382.
101Id. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383 (quoting Lando, 441 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)).
Justice Brennan, however, did not see this concern as compelling the creation of an absolute
newsperson's privilege. See supra note 86.
105 89 N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383.
'06 Id.; see also Branzburg v. Haves, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
'07 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706; see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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statute. 0 8 The Maressa court proceeded to hold that the Shield Law
affords newspersons an absolute privilege against disclosure of either
confidential sources or editorial processes, unless there is a contrary
constitutional right of the plaintiff involved. 09 Thus the Maressa court
considered whether a plaintiff's right to sue to recover damages for
defamation is constitutionally protected." 0
Initially, Justice Pashman's analysis of this issue acknowledged
the general rule that the purpose of defamation actions is the protection of reputations from false, injurious attacks."' He noted, however, that as a creation of state tort law, defamation actions can be
limited or even eliminated through the creation of testimonial privileges as long as no constitutional rights are thereby infringed." 2 Paul
v. Davis," 3 which held that a plaintiff's interest in his reputation is
not a liberty or property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee," 4 was cited by the majority for the
proposition that this interest "is simply one of a number which the
State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law." 1 5 Absent a
constitutional guarantee for defamation actions," 6 the Maressa court
observed that any federal interest other than that in protecting indi-

"08
89

N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383; cf. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1333 (1982)

(standing to challenge search and seizure protected by New Jersey Constitution); State v.
Schmid, 84 N.J, 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (free speech rights protected by New Jersey Constitution). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
10989 N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383.
110Id. at 188-89, 445 A.2d at 383.
111Id. at 190, 445 A.2d at 384; see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473
(1956); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955).
112 89 N.J. at 190-91, 445 A.2d at 384; see Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
113 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
114 89 N.J. at 190 n.7, 445 A.2d at 384 n.7. The plaintiff in Paul was suing local law
enforcement authorities for falsely labeling him an active shoplifter in a flyer distributed to retail
merchants in his community. Paul, 424 U.S. at 694-96. The plaintiff was denied relief because
the Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, did not accept "that reputation alone . . . is
either 'liberty' or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 701.
11 89 N.J. at 190, 445 A.2d at 384 (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 712); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (in addition to impairing property interest in attending school, suspension of
student impaired liberty interest in reputation); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (due process must be afforded individual whose good name suffered as result of being
publicly labeled problem drinker by authorities).
11089 N.J. at 191, 445 A.2d at 384; accord Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d
Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania Constitution does not create constitutional interest in defamation).
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viduals from arbitrary or irrational state action has been held subordinate to the interest of a state in establishing its own tort law rules." 7
The majority also rejected the argument, advanced in Justice
Schreiber's dissent, that defamation actions are constitutionally guar8
anteed by article 1, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution,"
which states that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse of that
right.""9 The majority construed the italicized phrase not as an affirmative grant of a right to sue in libel, but rather as an admonition
that libel suits were not to be precluded by the paragraph's apparently
sweeping protection of speech. 20 One justification the majority offered for not construing defamation as having a constitutional source
was that a constitutional amendment would then be required in order
to effect what the court understood the legislature to have intended:
complete protection for sources or editorial processes.' 2' When this
result is brought about through statutory interpretation, the majority
reasoned, the legislature can always adjust the court's perception of its
22
intent, if erroneous, by subsequently changing the law.
Since the court recognized neither a federal nor a state constitutional basis for defamation actions, it quickly disposed of the plaintiff's contention that denying him discovery infringed his right to due
process. 23 Absent such a basis, the court found that the plaintiff's
right would be subject to the legislature's balancing of the competing
interests involved.2 4 Because the legislature had enacted a compre-

"1 89 N.J. at 191, 445 A.2d at 384; see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). The court
cited the privileges accorded statements made in judicial and administrative agency proceedings
as other nonarbitrary, rational limitations on the tort of defamation. 89 N.J. at 191, 445 A.2d at
384.
11 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 384-85.
"I N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 6 (emphasis added).
'10 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 385. Justice Pashman expressed the opinion that "[h]ad the
framers intended . . . [to create a right to sue for damages in libel] . . . , they surely would have
expressed that intent more directly." Id.
121 Id. at 192-93, 445 A.2d at 385.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 193, 445 A.2d at 385. The court observed that Maressa had cited the passage from
Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956), stating that "construction of the
[Shield Law) permitting the deprivation of a party's right of cross-examination on vital issues of
his cause of action could create constitutional difficulty or infirmity." 89 N.J. at 193, 445 A.2d at
385 (citing Brogan, 22 N.J. at 154, 123 A.2d at 481). Although the court dismissed this obvious
allusion to a potential due process deprivation as dictum, Brogan was nonetheless specifically
overruled to the extent that it disagrees with the majority's finding of an absolute newsperson's
privilege. Id. at 194 n.8, 445 A.2d at 385 n.8.
124 89 N.J. at 193-94, 445 A.2d at 385.
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hensive privilege without any limiting statutory language, the court
determined that it had clearly intended an absolute newsperson's
125
privilege in libel cases.
After discussing the waiver of a newsperson's Shield Law privilege 126 and the proper role of summary judgment in libel cases, 127 the
majority opinion concluded by stressing both the importance of a free
press to our form of government, and the power of the legislature to
limit nonconstitutional interests in order to preserve freedom of the
press. 28 Justice Pashman recognized, in dictum, the compensatory
value of libel judgments, but considered the relative worth of free
speech, as our "national currency," to be greater. 2 9 The court, however, repeated that it was merely enforcing a legislative enactment,
the result of a weighing of competing interests, that had already
0
struck the balance in favor of freedom of speech.13
In his dissent, Justice Schreiber observed that the common law
did not view libelous utterances as constitutionally protected
speech, 3 3 but that this rule was modified somewhat by the New York
Times holding that newspersons would not be liable for defamatory
statements concerning public officials unless the plaintiff showed that
they had been made with actual malice. 132 This increased burden,
observed the dissent, created a problem for New York Times plaintiffs
in securing evidence of the defendant's state of mind. 133 Justice
Schreiber argued that the United States Supreme Court in Lando had

125

Id.

126 Id.

at 194-96, 445 A.2d at 385-86. Maressa's argument that the defendants had waived

their Shield Law protection by the partial disclosure of their sources was refuted by Justice
Pashman's majority opinion. He noted that the 1977 Shield Law amendments had created
separate information and source privileges, which made a finding of waiver more difficult. Id. at
195, 445 A.2d at 386.
127 Id. at 196-200, 445 A.2d at 386-89. Justice Pashman discussed at some length the importance of using summary judgment procedures, when appropriate, to expedite libel litigation and
thus avoid the "chilling" of press freedom that may result if protracted, meritless actions against
media defendants are allowed to become commonplace. While admitting that the newsperson's
privilege "may burden some libel plaintiffs who will not survive a summary judgment motion
without discovery," the court nonetheless endorsed it as another burden, like the New York
Times actual malice rule, which is properly placed upon plaintiffs in the interest of protecting
libel defendants. Id. at 198, 445 A.2d at 387.
128 Id. at 200-02, 445 A.2d at 389-90.
129 Id.
at 201, 445 A.2d at 389.
130 Id. at 201-02, 445 A.2d at 389-90.
131 Id. at 203, 445 A.2d at 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 482-83 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
132 89 N.J. at 203, 445 A.2d at 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 59-73 and
accompanying text.
133 89 N.J. at 204, 445 A.2d at 391 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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clearly recognized that discovery of a newsperson's editorial processes
was essential to proving actual malice under the New York Times
rule. 3 4 The dissent stressed the Lando Court's concern that prohibiting discovery might so limit an individual's cause of action for defamation that the newsperson's immunity from liability would be all
but absolute. 35 Such a result would be, in the view of the Lando
36
majority, "an untenable construction of the First Amendment."'
Justice Schreiber next opined that an individual's right to a defamation action, although not protected at the federal level,' 37 nonetheless is guaranteed by article 1, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution. 38 In both the 1844 and 1947 constitutions, that paragraph
provided: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."' 39 It is not clear what the framers of the 1844 constitution
intended by the latter clause, 40 but the dissent cited a number of
authorities which indicated that the freedoms of speech and of the
press were generally regarded as being qualified by the responsibility
to answer in defamation for their abuse.1 4 1 Justice Schreiber thus
concluded that this language was inserted in the 1844 Constitution to
protect persons from defamation by acknowledging that responsibility, thereby creating a constitutional right to sue in libel. 42 Justice
Schreiber maintained that the absolute Shield Law privilege protecting disclosure of editorial processes created by the majority in most
cases would prevent a New York Times plaintiff from proving actual
134

135

Id. at 205, 445 A.2d at 391 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Id. In Lando, the majority interpreted New York Times and its progeny as intending that,

"unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of the alleged
defamer would be open to examination." Lando, 441 U.S. at 160.
13689 N.J. at 205, 445 A.2d at 391 (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (quoting Lando, 441 U.S. at
176).
137 Id. at 206, 445 A.2d at 392 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (no federal right to redress for defamation in absence of interest conferred on individual
by state).
138 89 N.J. at 206, 445 A.2d at 392 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
"I N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 6.
140 89 N.J. at 207, 445 A.2d at 392 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting); see 2 NEW JERSEY WRITERS'
PROJECr 144 (1942). There is no mention in the proceedings of the constitutional convention of
1844 of the exact meaning of the phrase "being responsible for the abuse of that right." Id.
141 89 N.J. at 207-08, 445 A.2d at 392-93 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 311 (1825) ("[t]he liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who
used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse"); King v. The Dean of St. Asaph, 3 TR 657, 661
(1784) ("[t]he liberty of the press consists in printing without any previous license, subject to the
consequence of law"); W. ODcERs, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 111 (1881)
("[a]ny man is free to speak or to write and publish whatever he chooses of another, subject only
to this, that he must take the consequences").
142 89 N.J. at 208, 445 A.2d at 393 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
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malice, and thus effectively destroy this constitutionally protected
143
cause of action.
Justice Schreiber also took issue with the majority on its statutory
interpretation. Since the Shield Law specifically refers not to the
newsperson's impressions, conclusions, or intentions regarding privileged information, but only to its source, the dissent stated that it
144
could not reasonably be interpreted to cover editorial processes.
Justice Schreiber noted that there was no support for such a construction in the legislative history. 145 He suggested that it would be more
appropriate to assess the lawmakers' intent in light of their presumed
knowledge of the common-law bias against evidentiary privileges as
being in derogation of the search for truth, 146 than to assume that they
intended to create "an absolute privilege to resist the most direct form
of inquiry into the precise matter the plaintiff is required to prove
with 'convincing clarity.' "147
In Maressa the majority followed a simple, two-part line of
reasoning. Justice Pashman first interpreted the language and history
of the New Jersey Shield Law as indicating a legislative intent to
accord newspersons an absolute privilege not to disclose their confidential sources and editorial processes.1 48 This limitation on libel
actions was permissible, since the court decided that one had no
constitutional right to maintain a libel action.149 Had there been such
a right, the court would had to have weighed the rights of the plaintiff
against the ends served by the privilege, much as in the Shield Law
cases involving criminal defendants. 50 Thus, a finding that there was
no constitutional right to bring a libel suit was essential to the court's

13
144

Id. at 208-09, 445 A.2d at 393 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Id. at 210, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Schreiber

pointed out that subsection (a) of the statute, which lists for protection "[t]he source, author,
means, agency or person from or through whom any information was procured, obtained,
supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated or delivered," N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983), focuses on "the identity of the third
person who acted as a conduit of the information." 89 N.J. at 210, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting).
15
89 N.J. at 210, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 211, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see also 8 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2912
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
14789 N.J. at 210-11, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting); see Lando, 441 U.S. at 192
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
4 See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
'4
See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
150See State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (1980); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d
330 (1978); supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
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sole reliance for its decision on the legislative intent behind the Shield
Law.
Since there is clearly no right to sue in libel guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution, 5 1 the determinative language must be found in
article 1, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Maressa
majority acknowledged that the phrase "being responsible for the
abuse of that right" was an allusion to libel actions, but disagreed
with Justice Schreiber's conclusion that this phrase created a constitutional right to sue. 152 Rather, Justice Pashman determined that this
phrase merely limited the broad rights of speech granted in article 1
by not precluding libel actions. 53 The distinction between "creating"
a right to sue and "not precluding" that right is difficult to make with
any certainty. There is no explication of this phrase in the record of
the constitutional proceedings, 5 4 and the arguments advanced by
both the majority and by Justice Schreiber seem at first glance to be
equally plausible.
Justice Pashman suggested that if the framers had intended to
create a right to sue in libel, they would have done so more directly. 5
It may be argued, however, that the inclusion of a qualifying phrase
whose clear meaning was that speakers and writers were subject to
libel suits1 56 did directly create the right to sue. Rather than stating
that "every person shall have the right to sue in libel," the framers
qualified the granted speech rights by using a phrase commonly accepted as having that very meaning. That the rights of a speaker were
commonly accepted as being limited by the corresponding right of
those adversely affected by that speech may be seen by an examination
of the case law in existence at the time the New Jersey Constitution
57
was written. 1
The majority further asserted that the disputed phrase was only a
caveat intended to ensure that the protection of speech was not absolute. 5 8 In order to have any force as a limitation on a constitutional
right, however, would it not have to receive the same constitutional
protection as the right modified? Had the framers not so intended, the

151Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Contra id. at 719 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (due
process denial when plaintiff who sues for damages to reputation is denied cause of action).
152 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 384-85.
153

Id.

See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
15 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 385.
151 Id. at 207-08, 445 A.2d at 392-93 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
157 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
151 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 385.
154
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right of action implied by this caveat might at any time be modified or
removed by statute,1 59 and the limitation would thus have been entirely devoid of true content or effect. Assuming that the phrase was
not a vain addition to article 1, then, requires the conclusion that the
libel actions to which it referred were intended to be constitutionally
equivalent to the liberties of speech and of the press.' 60 It thus seems
that there is at least as strong an argument in favor of that clause
creating a right to sue in defamation as there is to the contrary.
The court stated that the 1977 amendments to the Shield Law
made it clear that the legislature intended "to provide comprehensive
protection for all aspects of news gathering and dissemination." 6 1 An
examination of those changes, however, reveals that the same aspects
of news gathering are protected in the new law as in the old: sources
and information. 6 2 The legislature did create separate privileges for
each so that a finding of waiver would be more difficult,16 3 but that
only evidences an intent to give more complete protection to those
aspects already covered by the prior enactment.
It is also true that the law was updated in 1977 to expand the
applicability of the privilege to persons working in all news media,
rather than just for newspapers. 61 4 That change did not alter the scope
of the substantive protection afforded; it merely enlarged the class of
persons benefited by the statute. Similarly, the addition in 1977 of an
enumeration of the types of proceedings in which the privilege could
be invoked 65 was simply a clarification of where and when the news-

159 Id. at 190-91, 445 A.2d at 384; see Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 523, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (absent any constitutional deprivation, state may restrict or
eliminate cause of action it has created).
10 This conclusion is consistent with the widely accepted view that -'[n]o statute is to be
construed as altering the common law, further than its words import." Shaw v. North Pa. R.R.,
101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879); see also 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01
(4th ed. 1974).
161 89 N.J. at 186, 445 A.2d at 381 (emphasis added).
162 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:84A-21 (West 1977) (current version at id. (West Cum.
Supp. 1982-1983)) (describing privileged matter in two subsections-one covering sources, other
relating to information "obtained in the course of pursuing ... professional activities") with id.
(West 1960) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983)) (listing source and information privileges in one sentence, and limiting privileged information to that which was published).
163 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text; see also In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J.
Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980) (partial disclosure of information by reporter did not
effect waiver of other information by operation of statute).
164 See supra note 17.
65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1977) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp. 19821983)) defines the types of proceedings as "any legal or quasi-legal proceeding . . . .including
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person would be protected, but did not in any way change what
information was privileged. The most striking substantive change
enacted in 1977 was to make the information privilege applicable to
all information, whether or not disseminated, that was "obtained in
the course of pursuing . . . professional activities." 6 6 Again, however,
this was the apparent result of a legislative intent to make the two
privileges as waiver-proof as possible by carefully defining two discrete categories of protected subject matter. 6 7 The legislature's intent
not to change the essential nature of the information privileged under
the statute is evidenced by its defining "in the course of professional
activities" to mean only those situations where "a reporter obtains
information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public." 6 8 A
newsperson's editorial processing-thoughts regarding the information received, beliefs as to the veracity of sources, prepublication
memos, and discussions with other newspersons about the handling of
a particular story 169-is composed of mostly subjective elements, and
clearly is not information obtained for dissemination to the public.
Thus the legislature, in so defining the information privileged under
the statute, has implicitly excluded the very type of information the
majority found it had an intention to protect.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Farber, cited by the majority
as recognizing a strong legislative intent to protect newspersons, 70 did
not deal with the question of editorial processes, and in fact only
recognized in the 1977 amendments a legislative intent to protect
"confidential sources ... as well as information so obtained." ' 7 Thus
Farber's recommendation of a liberal construction of the intended
protection did not extend to a general application of the Shield Law,

•. . any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative
committee, or elsewhere." Id.; see also supra note 44.
166 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West 1977) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp.
1982-1983)); see In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423 A.2d 695 (Law Div. 1980). The
Vrazo court maintained that the legislature was probably aware that the changes extended the
information privilege to all information, even if received from a nonprivileged source. The
original bill read: '(b) any news or information so obtained in the course of pursuing his
professional activities whether or not it is disseminated." When the word "so" was deleted, the
information covered by the privilege was no longer limited to that obtained from the sources
protected by subsection (a) of the statute.
"7 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; N.J.A. 97, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1 (1982).
168 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West 1977) (current version at id. (West Cum. Supp.
1982-1983)) (emphasis added).
166 Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd,
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
170 89 N.J. at 186-87, 445 A.2d at 382.
'7'
Farber, 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
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but was rather confined to situations involving confidential sources
and information obtained from them.' 72 The statement from Boiardo
characterizing Farber as holding "that the privilege created by
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21, was intended by the Legislature to be as broad as
possible,"' 1 3 must be read in light of that limitation. It must be
remembered, too, that both cases dealt with the need of a criminal
defendant for a newsperson's confidential information, and not with
7 4
requests for discovery of editorial processes in civil actions.1
The Maressa majority nonetheless concluded that a strong legislative intent to protect confidential sources and information from disclo75
sure a fortiori implied the same intent to protect editorial processes. 1
No attempt, however, was made to explain why the two categories of
information were so similar, or the policy reasons for according them
privileges so analogous, that the protection of one by the legislature
6
should necessarily imply the additional intent to protect the other. 17
If the plaintiff's argument that editorial processes are not protected
because not enumerated by the statute is "simplistic," 1 77 then Justice
Pashman's interpretation is equally faulty as being overbroad. He
finds a legislative intent to protect "all significant news-gathering
activities" in the fact that the statute contains an "exhaustive list" of
activities. 78 Those activities appear in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A21(a), however, which refers specifically to "source[s]. . . through
whom" a newsperson receives information. 79 The paragraph does not
extend protection to the activities, but to the identities of the persons
who engage in them. 8 0 It thus matters little whether editorial pro-

172 Id.; see Central N.J. Jewish Home v. New York Times Co., 183 N.J. Super. 445, 449, 444
A.2d 80, 82-83 (Law Div. 1981); see also infra note 174.
173 Boiardo, 82 N.J. at 457, 414 A.2d at 20.
114See id.; In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978); see also Central N.J. Jewish Home
v. New York Times Co., 183 N.J. Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80 (Law Div. 1981) (libel action in which
court refused to find that broad Shield Law interpretation called for by Farber and Boiardo be
extended to editorial processes).
175 89 N.J. at 187-88, 445 A.2d at 382.
The majority stated that discovery of editorial processes was detrimental to a free press
because it "inhibits the exchange of ideas." Id. at 188, 445 A.2d at 383. No comparison to the
motivations underlying the desire to protect confidential sources or information was made. See
generally Note, Source Protectionin Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 338,
359-61 (1981).
17789 N.J. at 188, 445 A.2d at 382.

178 Id.

171N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
"' See Central N.J. Jewish Home v. New York Times Co., 183 N.J. Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80
(Law Div. 1981). This case was virtually the converse of Maressa, yet there is no evidence of any
action by the legislature to amend the Shield Law in response thereto. That fact seemingly
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esses are included in the list or not, since newspersons are not even the
subject of that particular provision. There is likewise no indication
that "information obtained in the course of pursuing . . . professional
activities" was meant to be so broad as to include the editorial process.
In fact, as noted above, the definition of "in the course of pursuing
professional activities" indicates that it was aimed solely at the narrower category of information gathered for dissemination. Thus, the
Maressa majority understood a legislative intent to protect the entire
news-gathering process to arise from language clearly encompassing
only two carefully defined categories: sources and information.
Aside from the means by which the majority reached its conclusion, the propriety of granting an absolute editorial process privilege
must be seriously questioned. The United States Supreme Court in
Lando firmly rejected a claim that such a privilege arose from the first
amendment. 81 Justice Pashman found Lando inapplicable because
"[t]here was no Shield Law at issue in the case."'' 8 2 Earlier in the
majority opinion, however, the Shield Law was said "[t]o buttress the
constitutional protection for news gathering," 8 3 referring to the recognition in Branzburg that a newsperson's gathering of information is
entitled to some protection under the first amendment.8 4 It seems
strange that a statute fortifying a constitutional protection should, by
the very fact of its enactment, become a vehicle for expanding the
scope of that protection beyond the limits set by the Supreme Court.
The Maressa majority found its authority for doing so in the statement
by the Supreme Court in Branzburg that "we are powerless to bar
state courts from . . . construing their own constitutions so as to
recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.""'8 That
case, however, dealt with a newsperson's privilege not to disclose
confidential information to grand juries, and the above-quoted passage referred to the creation of an absolute privilege in that specific
context. 86 Indeed, it has been suggested that the creation of absolute
implies the legislature's approval of an interpretation of the Shield Law precisely opposite to that
of Justice Pashman. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in June of 1982, a bill proposing
to amend the Shield Law to specifically exclude editorial processes from the privilege was
introduced in the New Jersey Senate. See N.J.S. 1519, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. (1982).
181 Lando, 441 U.S. at 158.
182 89 N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383.
1 Id. at 185, 445 A.2d at 381.
184 Id. at 184, 445 A.2d at 380.
's' Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
186 Id. This is evident when the quoted passage is read together with the immediately
preceding sentence:
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits,
to fashion their own standards in light of the conditionsand problems with respect to
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privileges for newspersons in other contexts might be inherently unconstitutional.1 87 It thus seems that the use of Branzburg to justify
dismissing Lando as inapposite has at least questionable validity.
Justified or not, the decision not to apply that holding carries a
number of implications for both newspersons and for future New York
Times libel plaintiffs in New Jersey.
Perhaps the most obvious result of an absolute privilege against
disclosure of the editorial process is that a number of New York Times
plaintiffs will almost certainly be unable to prove actual malice, and
thus will not be able to recover for defamation. 8 8 The corollary to
this, however, may be even more disturbing: Some newspersons will
thus be exempt from answering in libel for false, defamatory statements that may have been intentionally published. One commentator
has suggested that a perception that newspersons are somehow above
the law might result in efforts to regulate the news media, which
would ultimately cause more disruption than would the discovery of
editorial processes. 8" In addition, there is the chance that the plaintiff's reliance solely on circumstantial evidence to prove actual malice
may bring about more erroneous judgments against newspersons than
would result if the editorial process were discoverable. 90
Justice Brennan's partial dissent in Lando suggests a reasonable
answer to whether to permit newspersons an absolute privilege
against disclosure of their editorial processes in libel actions. His proposal was to allow discovery of a newsperson's mental processes since
this information may be crucial to the plaintiff's proof of actual
malice, and yet its disclosure would probably not result in any chilling

the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes
without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding
in their own way and construing their own constitution so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
Id. (emphasis added).
187 See Boiardo, 82 N.J. at 456 n.8, 414 A.2d at 20 n.8. That note provides in pertinent part:
While it is logical to assume that a state may cut back on rights or privileges for itself,
it is another matter indeed to suggest that a state can shrink the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of an individual, i.e., to fair trial ....
Such a reduction of
individual rights . . . would seem to suffer from inherent constitutional infirmity.
Id.
188 89 N.J. at 200, 445 A.2d at 389; see Lando, 441 U.S. at 160.
189Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, EditorialJudgment, And Freedom Of The Press: An Essay,
1978 U. ILL. L. F. 605, 630. The author suggested that once a movement was afoot to legislate
press accountability, the press would be forced into an active political role. Id.
I" Lando, 441 U.S. at 172-73. Justice White stated that "direct inquiry.., which affords the
opportunity to refute inferences that might otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence,
suggests that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all .. of the evidence before the
decision-maker." Id.
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of the newsperson's thought process. ' Before any objective editorial
processes such as newsroom conversations and memos could be discovered, however, Justice Brennan would require the plaintiff to make a
prima facie showing that a defamatory falsehood had been published.' 9 2 Such an approach balances the public need for vigorous,
probing pressroom dialogue against the individual need for a means of
proving actual malice when one's reputation has in fact been
harmed.

9 3

This compromise approach, allowing as it does for the interests of
both newspersons and libel plaintiffs, seems far preferable to the result
reached by Justice Pashman. One may take issue with the court's
interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution, with its construction of
the Shield Law, or with the conceptual grounds on which it rejected
Lando, but the most telling observation is a simple one: The Maressa
majority has created an absolute privilege which appears to be unnecessary to the protection of either the freedom or the efficacy of the
news media.
The disclosure of a newsperson's editorial processes, unlike the
revelation of confidential sources or information, will not impair the
news-gathering process by silencing potential informers wary of exposure, since the newspersons are the original sources of the information
sought. Neither should newsroom discussions be restricted by the
possibility of their later discovery, since newspersons will still have a
strong interest in accurate reporting because of potential liability for
the publication of knowing or reckless falsehoods.' 9 4 Such discovery
would certainly not chill the thought processes of newspersons either,
one who
for as Justice Brennan suggested in his Lando partial dissent,
5
newsperson.'1
a
be
longer
no
would
thinking
stopped
Thus, an absolute privilege is not needed to assure the continued
freedom of newspersons to gather and prepare the news. Justice Brennan's requirement that a New York Times libel plaintiff make a prima

191Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
192Id. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
"I' Once this prima facie showing has been made, however, the possibility remains that the
plaintiff will abuse the broad scope of discovery by requesting massive amounts of information
from the media defendant. Justice Marshall has suggested that, in recognition of the constitutional interests at stake, discovery requests in libel suits "'should be measured against a strict
standard of relevance," in order to prevent these excesses. Id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice White voiced a similar concern, calling for stricter application of the "relevance" standard of FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b)(1), and for broader use by judges of their power to restrict oppressive
discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Lando, 441 U.S. at 177.
I" Lando, 441 U.S. at 173-74.
1'5 Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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facie showing of defamatory falsehood before being allowed discovery
of the objective aspects of the editorial process would ensure that even
this slight intrusion into the media news process was entirely justified.
The threat of burdensome discovery could be virtually eliminated by
applying a strict relevancy standard to discovery requests in libel suits
against the news media, as suggested by Justice Marshall, and proceedings could be quickly terminated by the granting of summary
judgments whenever possible. 196
If these procedures were adopted, the newsperson's editorial
processes and the news media's freedom and vitality could be preserved without the necessity of further limiting the ability of a public
figure or official to recover in libel. The New York Times actual
malice standard was evidently considered by the Court in Lando as
the proper balance between the needs of a robust press, and those of
an allegedly defamed individual. Denying discovery of the editorial
process to plaintiffs who must bear the burden of proving the defendant's state of mind unwisely tips that balance toward actual or
perceived press immunity to libel actions. The Lando Court maintained the New York Times equilibrium by refusing to recognize an
absolute privilege against disclosure of a newsperson's editorial processes. If not the letter, then at least the logic of that decision should
have been adopted by New Jersey's highest court in Maressa.
Robert W. Smith

'9

89 N.J. at 196-200, 445 A.2d at 386-89; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.

